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Group differences and group evolutionary strategies—how different are Whites from others?

After reading The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy by Murray Friedman, 2005, I felt that the workings of Jewish evolutionary strategies were becoming clearer. I then reread Kevin MacDonald's 2002 book A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy, with Diaspora Peoples. I will review that book, and then turn back to Friedman's book to look for consistencies.

MacDonald explains, "The analogy with humans would be that stratified human societies offer the possibility of complex intrasocietal ecological strategies. D. S. Wilson (1989; see also Wilson & Sober 1994) has developed the theory of group-structured populations in which groups of individuals (coalitions) separate themselves off from the other members of the species. These groups can then be proposed to vary in their level of within-group altruism, ranging from extremely altruistic to completely individualistic. Because of their very high level of cooperation and even self-sacrifice, individuals within altruistic groups may then have higher biological fitness on average (i.e., leave more offspring) than individuals in individualistic groups. The result is that there is natural selection between groups."

Group evolutionary strategies have been hotly debated for as long as it has been proposed, and at least for me it makes sense. With humans however it becomes even more complicated, especially with the evolution of the modern state. Group cohesiveness can sometimes backfire, and the state—the group's or another—can annihilate a very cohesive group. The Jews, Armenians, Kurds, Ukrainians, etc.—genocide can follow too much group success. So it now becomes an interplay between the level of individualism versus particularism of different groups and how they live together under state control or internationally.

The story of Jewish particularism as outlined by MacDonald started about 2500 years ago, and led to two primary eugenic outcomes—for the Ashkenazi Jews an increase in general intelligence and an increase ethnocentrism. Very early in their history, and in competition with Hellenism, the Jews began to compete for scholarly recognition at the level of the individual, not just a few elite. In addition, as a diaspora peoples, they were always in competition with the majority communities around them, and were always in danger of being oppressed, isolated, killed, controlled, etc. as they often out-competed the mostly illiterate peoples they lived amongst.

In addition, "
The thesis that Judaism is an evolutionary strategy does not rely on the proposition that Jews represent a distinct race. The minimal requirement for the present theory of Judaism as a fairly closed group strategy is that there be genetic gradients between well-defined groups of Jews and gentiles within particular societies that are maintained by cultural practices. It is the genetic gradient and the coincident competition between significantly different gene pools that are of interest to the evolutionist. Clearly, such a proposal is compatible with some genetic admixture from the surrounding populations. However, an evolutionary perspective must also consider the hypothesis that widely dispersed Jewish populations have significantly more genetic commonality than local Jewish populations have with their gentile cohabitants, since this hypothesis is relevant to developing an evolutionary theory of the patterns of altruism and cooperation among widely scattered Jewish populations."

Genetic studies over the last few years have shown that Semites are far more closely related genetically than are Ashkenazi Jews to Whites. That brings up important and often misunderstood phenomena of how say Arabs and Jews can seem so different, and Ashkenazi Jews so similar to Whites. Under eugenic selection for traits like intelligence and ethnocentrism, Western Jews were able to increase their intelligence as well as naturally select for traits that made them look more Western than an Arab. Under numerous pogroms in
Europe, the more Semitic one looked the more likely one would be killed or banished. So a few White genes readily spread among Jews. Wolpoff (1997) explains this assimilation followed by reselection for traits such as East Asian eye-folds for protection from the sun. Even though some European genes kept entering the East Asians' gene pool, selection pressure retained genes for eye-folds (epicanthal fold).

Judaism enforces a conditional altruism. Jews were often oppressed and could easily lose their fortunes. Other Jews then would help them get reestablished. However, as Judaism is an elitist religion, obscure and poor Jews were not given much assistance, and tended to leave the community. The Old Testament shows that Judaism is not like any other religion in that God is representative of "kinship, ingroup membership, and separateness from others." Racial purity was an obsession from the time of the Babylonian exile until the present day—though it becomes harder to reconcile with present day liberalism.

So over time, Jews (henceforth meaning primarily Western or Ashkenazi Jews) became increasingly intelligent, ethnocentric, and increasingly aware of how they are being perceived by those around them. MacDonald notes that during times of persecution, Jews turned to "Kabbalistic writings,…characterized by 'xenophobic, nationalist and inflammatory.'…The response to persecution is therefore a tendency to stress a unique Jewish identity, rather than to assimilate."

The rationalization that Jewish people must remain racially pure for the sake of morality is truly one of the most bizarre I have come across. As MacDonald notes, "
The idea that Jewish separatism fundamentally derives from a moral, even altruistic, stance has been common throughout Jewish history. Baron (1952a, 12) notes that an integral aspect of the ideology of Judaism has been that 'segregation is necessary to preserve at least one exemplary group from mixing with the masses of others' who are viewed as morally inferior. Separatism not only is motivated by ethical reasons, but involves altruism: In being Jews, they were 'living the hard life of an exemplar.' And by serving as a morally pure exemplar, 'they were being Jews for all men' (italics in text)."

And yet do Jews seem any more moral than any other group? Of course not because morality changes over time and it is not dependent on religion—it is an acquisition module of system just like the language system—hardwired into our evolutionary machinery. Richard Dawkins' new book The God Delusion goes into the religion–morality argument, showing that they are not related. Atheists are just as moral as theists. He also notes that the more intelligent a person is, the more likely it is that they will not believe in god. So am I to believe that the highly intelligent, highly secular Jewish community is trying to maintain racial purity for an altruistic purpose for all mankind?

Judaism then has been obsessed with racial purity and elitism. MacDonald writes, "
All important honors and positions of public trust were dependent on establishing one's genealogy. Emphasizing the religious nature of the obligation to retain genetic purity, Jeremias (1969, 301–302; see also Mitterauer 1991, 312–313) notes that '[h]ere we have the most profound reason for the behaviour of these pure Israelite families—why they watched so carefully over the maintenance of racial purity and examined the genealogies of their future sons- and daughters-in-law before marriage.... For on this question of racial purity hung not only the social position of their descendents, but indeed their final assurance of salvation, their share in the future redemption of Israel.' The doctrine that only pure Israelites would share in the redemption brought about by the Messiah resulted in the belief that salvation itself depended on purity of blood….Given the hierarchy of racial purity, it is not surprising that individuals at the lower levels of racial purity would attempt to remove rigid barriers between groups. Epstein (1942, 190) indicates that the pressure to remove most legal barriers to intermarriage came from the non-priestly classes whose power was increased following the collapse of the Jewish state and the establishment of a hierarchy based on learning….While emancipation led to no structural changes in Germany, there were major ideological changes. The principle change was the attempt to recast Judaism as a universalist missionary religion whose mission was to continue to remain separate from the gentiles while showing them the true religion and leading them to more elevated ethical behavior—the ancient idea that Judaism represents 'a light of the nations' (Isa. 42:6). In the words of Nachmam Kochmal in the early 19th century, Judaism had survived 'so that it might become a Kingdom of Priests, i.e., teachers of the revealed absolute faith to the human race' (quoted in Meyer 1988, 155). Sorkin sums up this broad intellectual trend by noting that '[t]he ideologues thus effected a theoretical reconciliation of the inherent paradox: universal values could sustain the Jews' particularism, were indeed integral to it, since Jews had a role to play on the stage of universal moral history' (Sorkin 1987, 103; see also Endelman 1991, 196; Neusner 1987, 187; Patai 1971, 46)."

Until emancipation, Judaism did not need to apologize for not intermarrying. MacDonald notes that Judaism as a secular religion has been around since at least 1960, just when Blacks were being liberated, and increasingly Whites have been encouraged to intermarry with other races—until there will be just one brown race. This became then a real problem for Judaism and separatism.

MacDonald states, "
The Jewish civil religion acknowledges the tension between integration into American life and the survival of Judaism as a distinct group, but denies that there is any inherent conflict and actively attempts to promote the continuation of a powerful sense of group identity in the face of constant threats of assimilation emanating from the wider society. 'The civil religion's commitment to Jewish continuity constitutes a clear response to the threats to Jewish survival which have become manifest in recent decades' (Woocher 1986, 65).

"Once again, as in the 'light of the nations' concept so common throughout Jewish history, the proposed moral nature of Judaism is utilized as a rationale for maintaining the perpetuation of the group: 'The identification of Judaism with applied morality has been a primary Jewish civil religious strategy for vindicating both its embrace of America and its support of Jewish group perpetuation' (Woocher 1986, 28). The belief gradually emerged that 'the Jewish community qua Jewish community had an important contribution to make to American life, and the Jewish tradition had helped to shape America's values' (p. 45). In a manner that recalls the rationalization of the Reform movement for continued separation (see above), the continuation of Jewish group identity and a measure of cultural separatism were thus viewed as quintessentially true to American ideals because of their moral, civilizing influences on American life."

I am sure that most Jews do feel that they are a liberalizing influence on especially White America, but for who's purpose and how? Jews are highly over represented in politics, the media, and academic areas such as social science and psychology where public policy issues are promoted. To that end then, social scientists can turn our paper after paper on equality, racism, why Blacks fail, etc. without fear of their methodologies being questioned—they simply publish among themselves. Their kin then publish these studies in the media, leading to indoctrination of the masses and public policy being implemented based on propaganda. A plot by the Jews? Of course not, it is just that the Jews have an extremely high verbal intelligence, to be explained later. But it does allow them to set the moral agenda.

And it is not just high verbal intelligence. MacDonald notes that the high-investment parenting of Jews also eugenically selected for conscientiousness, which leads to resource acquisition. (Research has shown that high intelligence followed by conscientiousness are the two most important traits for success.)

As MacDonald explains, "
There is evidence in the ancient world for an intense interest in education among the Jews. The Jewish religious law was incredibly elaborated in the first centuries of the Christian era, culminating with the writing of the Mishnah and the Palestinian (Yerushalmi) and Babylonian (Bavli) Talmuds. These documents not only contain an extraordinary amount of sheer information, but also are presented in an extremely complex rhetorical style, so that thorough mastering of Jewish law requires an extremely high level of literacy, the retention of voluminous detail, and the ability to follow highly abstract arguments."

This is how Judaism implemented the first documents for testing intelligence—in essence the first IQ tests. In order to compete for scholarly recognition, mastering the content of these texts required both high verbal intelligence and conscientiousness to study extremely hard and a willingness to postpone other gratifications. "
At the very center of Judaism, therefore, was a set of institutions that would reliably result in eugenic processes related to intelligence and resource acquisition ability."

The Jewish eugenics' program was not of course drawn up in advance, but evolved under a specific ecological niche. MacDonald explains that, "One need not suppose that there was a conscious intent on the part of the rabbis to develop a Torah that could serve as a forum for high-stakes intellectual competition. Once scholarship was established as the [greatest good] and the key to social status, resource control, and reproductive success within the Jewish community, there would be intense competition to develop an intellectual reputation. The writings produced as a result of this competition therefore become increasingly complex and inaccessible to those with less intellectual ability. Within a fairly short time, one could not hope to enter the arena without a very long period of preparation, a firm dedication, and persistence, as well as (I would suppose) native intellectual ability." And later, "
Despite the logical veneer, the point was not to make a rational, scholarly argument. A great deal of intelligence was required, but ultimately there was no attempt to seek truth, religious or otherwise. These writings are thus ultimately irrational. And as is inevitable with irrational undertakings, acceptance of the Jewish canon was essentially an act of authoritarian submission."

On my way home at night, I often listen to the neoconservative Michael Medved on talk radio, and the oddity of the Jewish mind fascinates me. First, he is so loaded with facts that he has an immense reservoir to select from to win an argument. Secondly, because of his verbal skills, it is impossible to win any argument with him because these facts are selectively used to make his point. I also note that he is completely clueless when it comes to rational thinking where knowledge of evolution or human behavior, or even statistical data is concerned—such as correlation does not mean causation. When it comes to religion he argues that
America must be religious to be moral. Is Medved really a believer in God? I doubt it—few neocons are religious though they push religion on the masses, even coming down on the side recently of intelligent design. In essence then, his objective is to mold the American mind, not to try and understand it.

The Jewish mind then is truly unique and different. MacDonald sums up numerous studies: "
Taken together, the data suggest a mean IQ in the 117 range for Ashkenazi Jewish children, with a Verbal IQ in the range of 125 and a Performance IQ in the average range. These results, if correct, would indicate a difference of almost two standard deviations from the Caucasian mean in Verbal IQ—exactly the type of intellectual ability that has been the focus of Jewish education and eugenic practices. While precise numerical estimates remain somewhat doubtful, there can be no doubt about the general superiority of the Ashkenazi Jewish children on measures of verbal intelligence (see also Patai & Patai 1989, 149)."

MacDonald then summarizes the Jewish mind from 2500 years of a eugenic breeding program as follows. Jews are:

Extremely good at delay of gratification. This takes intelligence as well as conscientiousness, and it is something that I have noticed. They can go into some low paying but intellectually challenging line of work, but eventually they will dominate the field or move to more lucrative monetary pursuits. Whites tend more to go after monetary rewards as soon as possible.

Extremely guilty if they do not meet their goals. High investment parenting, and especially combining intense affection along with anxious care giving is a combination of genes and environment. Still, guilt is a trait often found in Jews and it drives them to succeed.

Capable of  "continual disagreement within an overall context of solidarity." For example, the debate over
Israel is intense and continuing, but Jewish solidarity is maintained despite intense rivalry with regards to what is best.

Generally extroverted. This is another behavioral trait that lends itself to success.

"[I]ntensely reactive to environmental contingencies." Jews are more sensitive to perceived threats because they lived under constant threat. Those that could not deal with pogroms defected—the remainder became genetically more prone to react to anticipated danger.

Agreeableness is one of the big-five personality traits—and it is not necessarily a good trait; it depends on the context. Disagreeable people often go their own way, not following the herd, and are more creative. However, "such a trait would appear to be critical to membership in a cohesive, cooperative group such as Judaism."

As a eugenicist primarily interested in improving the White race, the reason that Jewish versus White intellectual and behavioral traits is so important to understand is because Whites, to the best of my knowledge, are generally low in ethnocentrism and are easily indoctrinated to adopt universal moralism, putting the welfare of other races ahead of our own. All other races of any significance to Whites: Blacks, Asians, and Semites—are all high in ethnocentrism. So when the powers of Jewish intellectuals strongly influence White acquiescence to the demands of other races in areas like affirmative action, immigration, transfers of national wealth, and the displacement of White cultures with those from other nations, it becomes an issue of survival. The White race is dying out in numbers and in culture—we are being displaced.


In The Neoconservative Revolution, Friedman concludes his book with:

"The idea that Jews have been put on earth to make it a better, perhaps even a holy place, continues to shape their worldview and that of many of their co-religionists. David Gelernter puts it succinctly: 'Conscience . . . the devil once said, is a Jewish invention, too ... and he was right.'

"Like most Americans, Jews will reject calls for 'family values,' self-discipline, self-reliance, and 'compassionate conservatism' if they turn out to be only empty slogans. Irving Kristol seemed always to understand that
while conservative Republicans continually denounced the welfare state, they rarely offered an alternative vision of how Americans should be governed in domestic affairs: 'In America all successful politics is the politics of hope,' he declared, 'a mood not noticeable in traditional American conservatism.'

"This book suggests that Jews and non-Jews alike are becoming more con
servative, in part because of their neoconservative guides, who have made it more respectable to think in these terms. If I am correct, the task for neoconservatism is clear. It must infuse American life with a new vision that will strengthen democracy at home and abroad, increase the social and economic well-being of all Americans, and set an example for the rest of the world."

In Friedman's opinion then, a handful of Jewish neoconservatives, using the leverage of intellect and political influence, can alter
America's ethos through the same mechanisms that took effect in the 1930s under the influence of Jewish socialists/Marxists—the long march through our institutions. Some issues he discusses in his book sheds light on the differences between Jews and Whites, and makes their goals more transparent.

Friedman states, "A new generation of Jewish neocons have lined up behind the Bush Doctrine. Moreover, as threats to
Israel's safety and security have mounted, coupled with an increase in anti-Semitism in Western Europe, Jews have a nagging sense that they remain an endangered people. The deeper their anxieties, the more likely their move to greater conservatism…."

This statement is too timid, as the Bush Doctrine is not Bush's but the neocons. As soon as the
Soviet Union fell, they needed another reason for a martial oriented America—one that would make the world safe for Israel and Jews everywhere. Is this conservatism anything like paleoconservatism? Not at all:

"For many Jews of any political persuasion, 'Jewishness'
is not measured by synagogue attendance or the formal aspects of faith, even though a number of the younger Jewish conservatives today are turning back to traditional religion. Many of the older generation of neocons profiled here, while proud of their Jewish ancestry, rarely attended synagogue. In an essay describing his political shift from left to right, Joseph Epstein observed that even for the non-observant Jew, Jewishness exercises 'a subtle influence upon one's political consciousness,' adding that his own conservatism resulted from his being 'made aware of anti-Semitism as a principal fact of life.'"

Friedman admits that, "It is no exaggeration to suggest that during the 'golden age,' [last sixty years] Jews, for better or worse, came to play a critical role in defining
America to other Americans.

"A more significant and perhaps more enduring measure of their advance was the increased presence of Jews on the faculties of universities that had previously excluded them. In 1946, there was not a single Jewish tenured professor at Yale. By
1960, 28 of the University's 260 full professors were Jewish. Elsewhere, the advance was even more spectacular, especially in disciplines likely to impact on the broader culture. At the most prestigious institutions, professors from Jewish backgrounds accounted for 36 percent of law faculties, 34 percent in sociology, 28 percent in economics, and 26 percent in physics. They also constituted 22 percent of the historians and 20 percent of philosophers – disciplines that had systematically barred them just a few years before."

Note that Jews only constitute about 2% of the American population (and 0.2% of the world population). Yet, if others point out their influence, we are called anti-Semites. And yet they repeatedly claim that they are the supreme elite that can alter the world's political behavior. MacDonald notes this victimhood modality: "
The [Jewish] ideology is non-falsifiable (and thus self-perpetuating) because it explains both success and failure in terms that imply continued allegiance to the group. Moreover, since adversity is always attributed to failure to obey religious practices, blame is always internalized. The result is to prevent a rational appraisal of the reasons for the adversity by examining the Israelites' behavior vis-a-vis their neighbors. Again, the typical response of Jewish populations to persecution has been a renewed intensity of religious fervor, often with strong overtones of mysticism."

That mysticism seems to be a strong current in the neocon movement, because it is not rational. Why does
America have to be a beacon for the world? Isn't government for the betterment of the nation's people? Do powerless dictators threaten us?  Friedman explains:

"In response [to the Holocaust], Jews and Jewish groups, along with allies in the labor movement and aristocratic WASP circles, began an all-out assault on prejudice and discrimination and other forms of injustice directed against Jews and other excluded groups. The role of the American Jewish Committee (the Committee), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and the American Jewish Congress (the Congress) took on a newfound importance. This effort involved 'a particular kind of social vision built around internationalism, liberalism and modernism' and stepped-up racial improvement efforts and 'progressive' politics more generally, which exerted extraordinary influence in shaping American political, economic, and cultural life.

"No longer seeing themselves simply as Jewish 'defense' agencies, Jewish civic bodies, which now referred to themselves as 'community relations' bodies, broadened their agendas to support social welfare programs of all kinds as part of the effort to strengthen democracy. Increasingly, they employed social science research to combat bigotry against all outsiders in the society. Often working in collaboration with universities, they embarked upon scholar-activist programs to bring about social change. They came to play a central role in shaping the newly developing field of intergroup relations as an integral part of the liberal agenda."

Again, this is what Kevin MacDonald has written about Jewish motivations, but when it comes from non-Jews it is anti-Semitic. Friedman also throws light on the "type" of Jewish intellectualism that MacDonald discusses:

"Howe also recollected that many of these young Jewish intellectuals bore the 'mark of Cohen' – that is, of philosophy professor Morris Cohen, who 'like a fencing master facing multiple foes . . . challenged students to his left and to his right, slashing their premises, destroying their defenses. . . . You went to a Cohen class in order to be ripped open and cut down.' It was from Cohen, Howe said, that he and other students gained their sharp, often abrasive intellectual style – intellectual life as 'a form of combat.'"

If Jews then are superb intellects, do Whites have any admirable traits? "… Irving Kristol told of training with soldiers from
Cicero, Illinois, a famously corrupt blue-collar town that the boy from Brooklyn had never heard of. 'I said to myself, "I can't build socialism with these people. They'll probably take it over and make a racket out of it."' Nevertheless, Kristol admired their 'can do' qualities. 'They convinced me that they knew more about people than I did.' Bell put it somewhat differently: 'I discovered that there were more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in the philosophy of Brownsville.'"

He goes on to describe the intensity of Jewish "ideological hothouse" of ideas—the world could be molded based on utopian ideas alone without any real understanding of human nature. The Jewish brain has been honed for intellectual dueling—it is not enough just to have resources and–or power. They must also try to mold the world in their each individual utopian concept, formed not to be practical but as ideological combat. Research was not required, only the production of ideas.

Is it any wonder that the war on terror is such a disaster with it being driven by the neocon mentality? Nothing to them is impossible if it can be proven true through philosophical debate. Ironically, Friedman notes, "
Although Strauss's philosophical views were complex, his central argument was relatively easy to understand: he held that the West, transfixed by modernism, utopian ideologies, and its new god, science, had lost its moral moorings. It stood in deep crisis due to a loss of purpose and required a return to an earlier classical tradition that focused on the 'formation of character' as the central issue in life. This way of thought would be free from extremism because it understood that evil could not be eliminated and that man could achieve only so much through his own exertions. Hence, in the classical tradition, political expectations were limited. The classical tradition focused on the moral character of the individual rather than the liberal notion of 'uninhibited cultivation of individuality.' Such individualism, he felt, was undefined and ever changing, always subject to the shifting whims of fashion."

He then goes on to describe other Jewish movements such as anarchism–libertarianism, Ayn Rand's objectivism, etc.—cults that are primarily intellectual and collectivist in its membership if not in its philosophy. These cult–authoritarian movements are also discussed by Kevin MacDonald in The Culture of Critique, and they follow a similar pattern of devotion to the leaders, absolute adherence to the party line, clannishness, and absolutism.

Friedman notes that, "
As many Jews began to move away from their religious tradition, they substituted a series of secular commitments aimed at making the world more just and humane. I have called this tendency 'the Utopian dilemma' (in a book of that title [1985]), suggesting that Jews have often put broader public needs above their own immediate or direct interests. Of course, Jews have hardly been alone in searching for meaning and even transcendence in political arrangements and movements. What will surprise many is that this penchant for causes, usually of a secular character, could move a number of Jews to the right as well as to the left."

Are these movements, however, for virtuous reasons or for the benefit of the Jewish tribe? Friedman goes on, "
Lyons accused the Anti-Defamation League in 1951 of 'a vicious attack' on the executive director of the American Jewish League against Communism. In 1964, Schlamm was also critical of 'New York Jews' for 'casting suspicion' on every man of the American Right for rabid anti-Semitism – a 'neurotic readiness' that was dangerous and unfounded. The following year, de Toledano alleged that the ADL was more interested in attacking the 'radical right' than in tackling growing anti-Semitism among blacks. Neurotic or not, the 'New York Jews' may have had a point."

The Jews really do have much more to fear from Hispanics, Blacks and Muslims than from Whites. We are more intelligent and are capable of understanding the tensions between races without resorting to conspiracy theories. We appreciate even more than Jews I think, that rationality is possible if we just debate the issues based on the best evidence.

Friedman remember is in favor of increased conservatism and supports the neocon agenda, and yet he writes: "
For Kirk and other more traditional conservatives, neoconservatism represented a schism in the left (like the Trotsky faction of the Communist Party). Kirk did not consider it an authentic variety of conservatism. 'The neo-conservatives,' he declared, 'were often clever but seldom wise.' He viewed their movement as 'a little sect,' lacking 'in the understanding of the human condition, and in the apprehension of the accumulated wisdom of our civilization.'"

Back to the
Iraq war to reinforce this observation, Friedman observes, "On foreign policy matters, in which neoconservatives would have enormous influence in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, Kristol declared, 'the goals of American foreign policy must go well beyond a narrow, too literal definition of national security.' Thus, the next generation of neocons — Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Kristol's son, William (through his own magazine, The Weekly Standard) — helped to persuade President Bush to pursue the war on terrorism by invading Iraq in March 2003."

Later he writes of Jewish awareness of threat:

"Podhoretz galvanized those moving into the neoconservative ranks. 'I can fix the exact moment when I – a reader of Commentary since my teens – was shocked to attention by an item in the magazine unlike anything I had ever read,' Harvard Yiddish scholar Ruth R. Wisse recalls. She described a July 1970 article by Podhoretz. 'By setting Vietnam within the context of U.S. History and the history of human civilization, he was saying that revulsion against a mistaken or misfought war cannot become an excuse for ideological pacifism; that despite its ugliness and inefficiency, the reality of war remains the final safeguard of freedom.... Its truth struck me particularly as a Jew.'

"Commentary became a force behind the Iron Curtain as well, providing encouragement to the restive peoples there. Neil Kozodoy and his colleagues at the magazine would hear from Poles and Hungarians and later Czechs that the magazine was being received and read, and that specific articles had been translated and distributed in samizdat versions.

"A central element in Podhoretz's evolving views, which would soon become his and many of the neocons' governing principle, was the question,
'Is It Good for the Jews?,' the title of a February 1972 Commentary piece. In 'My Negro Problem – and Ours,' his sense of Jewishness seemed almost attenuated. He wondered 'whether [Jews'] survival as a distinct group was worth one hair on the head of a single infant.' He recognized why Jews had struggled so hard to survive as a distinct group, but with the loss of that earlier theological memory, he wrote, 'I am less certain as to why we still do.'

"During the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s, his sense of his own Jewishness intensified, reflecting what Irving Howe called the immigrant 'weight of fear of living on the edge of unforeseen catastrophe.' The idea that Jews were increasingly on the fringes became evident to him as the civil rights revolution was transformed into a race revolution, bringing with it greater black anti-Semitism and a racial spoils system benignly described by its advocates as affirmative action.

"The new anti-Semitism reached its apotheosis when the United Nations, despite the
United States' objection, adopted a resolution equating Zionism with racism. By this time, Podhoretz was convinced that the postwar 'statute of limitations' on anti-Semitism was no longer in effect. Increasingly, neocons came to believe that the Jewish state's ability to survive – indeed, the Jewish community's will to survive – was dependent on American military strength and its challenge to the Soviet Union, the primary backer of Arab countries in the Middle East. The most ardent enemies of Jews and Israel were no longer on the right, Podhoretz professed, but on the left.

"Podhoretz denies, however, that his move to the right resulted solely from the perceived growth of anti-Semitism and the threat to Israel."

Again this thread shows the influence, power, and single mindedness of Jewish concerns. And it helps establish that the war on terrorism has been subverted in such a way as to serve Jewish interests alone; pacify the
Middle East for the benefit of Israel. So as it turns out, several dozen Jewish intellectuals have laid out our military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We also get again the glimpse of conscientiousness, Jewish tribalism, and non-rational decision making:

"Like a number of neocons in government, Abrams's instincts tended to be those of the policy advocate rather than the bureaucratic insider. 'Theory was everything to them,' J. David Hoeveler, Jr., writes. '[T]hey were strikingly indifferent to the vulgar real world.' Abrams admitted in an interview that 'neocons were a strange combination of naivete and sophistication.' They did not fit in well with hard-line Republican politicos. They were primarily idea men and women, not organizers or administrators, and least of all politicians. As intellectuals, they were more interested in symbols and exhortation than in the accommodation and political compromise at the heart of the political process."

Friedman then explains why recently the neocons have embraced Christianity and even intelligent design, as a tool to make alliances:

"In Commentary, Kristol acknowledged that Jews belonged to Jewish institutions and proudly identified themselves as Jews, but their religion, he explained, was 'only Jewish in its externals.' Jews are at heart secular humanists, he wrote, which may be 'why American Jews are so vigilant about removing all the signs and symbols of traditional religions from ' the public square,' so insistent that religion be merely a 'private affair,' so determined that separation of church and state be interpreted to mean the separation of all institutions from any signs of a connection with traditional religions.' Despite their growing unreliability on Israel, Kristol argued in another article in Commentary, the liberal church bodies were the favorite churches of the institutional Jewish community, because they are 'less aggressively Christian.'

"Secular humanism had been 'good for Jews,' Kristol conceded. It accounted for an 'unparalleled degree of comfort and security'; but given the moral disarray in American life, the force of moral tradition grounded in religion and religious teachings needed reassertion. Taken together with the fact that the Christian Right was a staunch supporter of
Israel, it became even more critical that Jews not turn their back on these putative allies."

Friedman admits that, "…
angry critics accused [the neocons] of pushing a naive and inexperienced president into an unnecessary imperial adventure." He then goes on to show how easy it was, "Their numbers today have increased to hundreds of individuals threaded throughout the news media, think tanks, political life, government, and the universities."

Friedman then reinforces MacDonald's observation that Judaism has always been about tribal survival:

"The older generation's interest in religion, however, tended to be more instrumental; that is, it has not been a deeply personal experience. Religion is necessary, they insisted, in order to ensure greater order and stability in society. Strengthening Judaism, especially among the young, would counter the effects of assimilation and provide support for the embattled state of Israel. It was only in recent years, for example, that the Kristols joined a synagogue. By contrast, a number of the younger generation neocons are – or have become – traditional or even orthodox Jews…. Driven by a fear of anti-Semitism, 'we tried to push religion out of American public life,' Abrams asserts, concluding that Jews should make religion the center of their lives again."

The neocons then are merely the old Trotskyites who see a different danger than liberal Judaism. He writes, "They are united in fighting what Irving
Kristol calls 'the upsurge of anti-biblical barbarism.' Aware of the deep fear of the Christian Right, Irving Kristol suggests that Jews should worry less about Christians converting them and more about Christians marrying them."

This book goes a long way in vindicating MacDonald's trilogy of books on the Jewish evolutionary strategy, and how Jews differ mentally from Whites. Jews of course are not a danger because of their essence; Jews are a danger because Whites are so weak and vulnerable from the Jews' ability to manipulate or indoctrinate us as they desire. Note how a handful of Jewish neocons first reached out to other Jews to convince them that new dangers lay ahead. And they tenaciously, as a small group, penetrated important areas of our society to basically have their way with us. It is not they who are sinister, it is us Whites who are unable to mobilize ourselves in order to preserve ourselves.



12-2006 by Matt Nuenke